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I.

INTRODUCTION

The autumn of 2001 in the Northeastern
United States was unprecedented in terms of aviation disasters. First came the mind-numbing
events of September 11, which kept the world
glued to its television sets for weeks. The story of
the four commercial aircraft that were hijacked
and ultimately flown into the World Trade Center
in New York City, the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia, and an open field near Shanksville, Pennsylvania, shocked and mesmerized viewers every-

where.
The two Boeing 767 aircraft, American Airlines
("American") Flight 11 and United Airlines
("United") Flight 175, that were intentionally
flown by hijackers into the World Trade Center
began conflagrations so intense that the Cockpit
Voice Recorders ("CVRs") and Flight Data Re* The author is a retired airline captain.
See

1

("NTSB"),

NATIONAL

TRANSPORTATION

SAFETY

AVIATION: COCKPIT VOICE RECORDERS

BOARD

(CVR)

AND

FLIGHT DATA RECORDERS (FDR), at http://www.NTSB.gov/

aviation/CVRFDR.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2002) [hereinafter

COCKPIT VOICE RECORDERS AND FLIGHT DATA RECORDERS].

Cockpit voice recorders record voices and other audible
sounds within the cockpit, such as the noises generated by
turning a switch on or off or positioning a flap handle. These
sounds are captured by area microphones and the crew
members' individual microphones. Flight data recorders record performance and configuration information from an
aircraft's systems, such as airspeed, altitude, acceleration
(also referred to as "G forces"), aircraft fuselage angle (also
referred to as pitch), angle of bank, and flight control and
landing gear positions. Early models recorded as few as five
parameters. The current generation of FDRs, called Digital
Flight Data Recorders ("DFDRs"), are required to monitor
and record at least 28 key parameters. DFDRs are capable of
monitoring and capturing information from more than 300
other onboard sources. Thus, DFDRs provide investigators
with a wealth of data from which they can then reconstruct
an accident, often by using computer simulation. Id. While
FDRs, DFDRs and the information they produce are crucial
to modern accident reconstruction, they are beyond the
scope of this Comment and are mentioned here only to provide a more complete picture of the tools of accident investi-

corders ("FDRs"),' which are designed to withstand severe impacts and extreme temperatures,
were never recovered. The devices were presumably consumed in the flames and the subsequent
collapse of the Twin Towers. The recorders from
the wreck of American Flight 77, the Boeing 757
that crashed into the Pentagon, and United Flight
93, also a 757, that crashed in Pennsylvania, survived to provide investigators with some clues regarding the events on board the aircraft. Of the
two CVRs recovered, only Flight 93's was func2
tional after impact.
Next, on November 12, American Flight 587
crashed shortly after takeoff from New York's
John F. Kennedy Airport ('1FK"), killing 265 persons. 3 The preliminary evidence showed that the
aircraft's vertical stabilizer 4 snapped off during or
5
shortly after an encounter with wake turbulence
from a Japan Airlines Boeing 747 aircraft that had
gation and reconstruction.
2 James O'Toole & Tom Gibb, Cockpit Tape Being Translated; Information Could Yield Key Clues to Flight 93, PrrFSBURGH
POsT-GAZErrE, Sept. 21, 2001, at Al.
3
See Marion C. Blakey, Opening Statement at the National Transportation Safety Board Fit. 587 Press Conference
(Feb. 8, 2002), available at http://www.ntsb.gov/Speeches/
blakey/mcb020208.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2002) [hereinafter Blakey Opening Statement].
4 The vertical stabilizer is the large fin that rises upward
from the tail of an airplane to give the aircraft directional
stability. Typically, a rudder is attached to the trailing edge of
the vertical stabilizer. For more information on this and
other components of an aircraft, see NATIONAL AERONAUTICS
AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION ("NASA"), GLENN RESEARCH
CENTER, AIRPLANE PARTS DEFINITIONS, at http://www.grc.
nasa.gov/WWW/K-12/airplane/airplane.html (last visited
October 1, 2002).
5 See Advisory Circular, U.S. Department of Transportation and Federal Aviation Administration, Aircraft Wake Tur-

bulence, available at http://www.bayareapilot.com/waketur
bulence.htm (October 1, 1991)

(last visited Apr. 17, 2002)

(explaining the concept of "wake turbulence," which is generated by every aircraft in flight).
Historically, when pilots encountered this wake in flight,
the disturbance was attributed to "prop wash," the swirl
of air trailing a propeller-driven aircraft caused by the

COMMLAW CONSPECTUS

taken off shortly before the American A300.15
While the first four crashes clearly were not accidents, 7 the crash atJFK apparently was." Common
among these seemingly unrelated crashes is that
the recovered CVRs and FDRs play an important
part in the investigations that follow air disasters.1
A civil aircraft accident within the United States
is normally investigated by the National Transportation Safety Board ("NTSB" or "the Board")."'

When found, the recorders are taken to the NTSB
laboratory in Washington, D.C. for retrieval and
analysis of any information they may contain. If it
is determined that an airplane crash is the result
of a criminal act rather than an accident, as is the
case with the four crashes of September 11, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") becomes
the lead investigative body, with the NTSB providing technical support. I I While major accident investigations may take years to determine a cause,
useful information can bring about important recommendations early in the investigative process.
For example, after the crash of American Flight
587 in New York, enough information was obtained from the investigation that on February 8,
corkscrew effect of its propeller. It is known, however,
that this disturbance is caused by a pair of counter rotating vortices trailing from the wing tips. The vortices
from large aircraft pose problems to encountering aircraft. For instance, the wake of these aircraft can impose
rolling moments exceeding the roll control capability of
some aircraft. Further, turbulence generated within the
vortices, if encountered at close range, can damage aircraft components and equipment and cause personal injuries. Id.
6 Press Release, NTSB, Update on NTSB Investigation
into Crash of American Airlines Flight 587 (Nov. 20, 2001),
available at http://www.NTSB.gov/Pressrel/2001/011120.
htm [hereinafter Press Release Flight 587].
7 Press Release, NTSB, NTSB Providing Technical Assistance to FBI Investigation (Sept. 13, 2001), availableat http:/
/www.NTSB.gov/Pressrel/2001/010913.htm TSB.gov/Pressrel/2001/010913.htm [hereinafter NTSB Providing Technical Assistance to FBI Investigation] (stating that because the
crashes of the four airliners on September 11, 2001 were
"criminal acts," the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI")
was named the "lead investigative agency" and was placed in
charge of "[releasing] all information on the progress of the
investigation").

8 See Press Release Flight 587, supra note 6 (stating that
after the Flight 587 crash, NTSB Chairman Marion C. Blakey
and FBI Director Robert Mueller remained in contact because the FBI was an "active participant in the investigation"). At the time of the press release, the NTSB had found
nothing to indicate that the crash of Flight 587 was "anything
other than an aviation accident." Id.
9 See Blakey Opening Statement, supra note 3 (explaining
that the "goal of... every [aircraft accident] investigationis to determine the cause of the accident and prevent its
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2002, less than three months after the accident,
the NTSB issued a Safety Recommendation on pilot training issues. The Safety Recommendation
noted that certain manipulations of rudder controls may "produce loads higher than those required for certification and that may exceed the
12
structural capabilities of the aircraft."
In the aftermath of any commercial aircraft
crash, requests are typically made for detailed information from the recorders.' 3 These requests
come from a wide variety of interested parties including the media, media watchdogs, sensation
seekers, family members of crash victims, and
plaintiffs' and defendants' attorneys.' 4 But the
law, as reflected by federal regulations and court
decisions, dictates that access to the actual audio
output of the recorder, i.e., the recordings as opposed to their transcripts, will be very limited and
will only be given to those directly involved in the
crash investigations. Access to the actual recordings is limited because, as the original legislation
mandating CVRs states, the information is intended solely for accident investigation purposes. 15
reoccurrence").
1) See NTSB, ABOUT THE NTSB: HISTORY AND MISSION, at
http://www.ntsb.gov/AbtNTSB/history.htm (last visited
Apr. 17, 2002). The NTSB is an independent federal agency
responsible for investigating all civil aviation accidents and
major rail, highway, marine and pipeline accidents in the
United States. Id.
I'
See 49 U.S.C. §1131(a)(2)(B) (2000). The statute
states that "[it] the Attorney General, in consultation with
the Chairman of the Board [of NTSB] determines and notifies the Board that circumstances reasonably indicate that the
accident may have been caused by an intentional criminal
act, the Board shall relinquish investigative priority to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation." Id. See also NTSB, ABOUT
THE

NTSB:

THE

INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS,

at http://

www.NTSB.gov/AbtNTSB/invest.htm (last visited Apr. 17,
2002) (detailing the circumstances under which the NTSB
handles an investigation of an aviation accident).
12
See Safety Recommendation Letter from Marion C.
Blakey, Chairman of the NTSB, to Jane F. Garvey, Adninistrator of the Federal Aviation Administration (Feb. 8, 2002),
available at http://www.ntsb.gov/Recs/letters/2002/
A02_0102.pdf (last visited Apr. 17, 2002) (detailing NTSB
safety recommendations A-02-01 and A-02-02, which seek to
rectify inadequate pilot training concerning the "structural
certification requirements for the rudder and vertical stabilizer on transport-category airplanes").
'3I
See, e.g., Jonathan D. Silver, Flight 93 Black Box Under
Wraps, PrI-TSBURGH POsTr-GAZEIT, Nov. 4, 2001, at A9 (discussing the public's difficulties in gaining access to the
United Flight 93 FDR).
14

See id.

See Installation of Cockpit Voice Recorders in Large
Airplanes Used By An Air Carrier or a Commercial Operator,
15

20031

"Privileged Communications?"

Beginning with the introduction of CVRs, there
has been an ongoing tension involving the government, air carriers, airline pilots, the press, and
the legal community regarding access to, and the
appropriate use of the audio tapes and transcripts
from the recorders. This Comment will outline
the history of the introduction of CVRs in the U.S.
civil air fleet as an aid to accident investigation,
including the acquiescence of airline pilots to the
invasion of their privacy in the interest of aviation
safety. Next, this Comment will describe the four
principal potential uses and abuses of the products of the recorders (recordings and their transcripts) and trace some of the history of each.
This Comment then will explore the principal positions of the various constituencies, especially in
the context of applicable legislation and litigation. The Comment next addresses the current
state of equilibrium. While not living up to the
originally intended narrow use of CVR recordings, it nevertheless provides a bright line rule
limiting access to the recordings to very specific
and narrowly defined circumstances outside of accident investigation, which are guided by carefully
prescribed rules of discovery. The Comment will
point out that the information available in publicly released transcripts should be adequate for
the needs of those outside the accident investigation arena, obviating the need to subpoena recordings for what amounts to fishing expeditions.
The Comment will then discuss current issues and
initiatives affecting the future of aircraft flight re-

corders, particularly an active proposal to mandate cockpit video recorders in commercial aircraft. Finally, this Comment will forecast that the
advent of cockpit video recorders will disturb the
delicate legal equilibrium that exists today, necessitating continued vigilance by Congress and the
courts.

29 Fed. Reg. 8401 (July 3, 1964) [hereinafter Installation of

gpsinfo.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2002) (providing a techni-

Cockpit Voice Recorders] (stating that the FAA's "only purpose in requiring the recorded information is to assist in determining the cause of accidents or occurrences" and that
the information is only to used in "connection with the inves-

cal description of GPS).
18 See EMS TECHNOLOGIES,

tigation of accidents or occurrences").
16
See Jack Cook, Part I, Training Days, at http://
www.ajcockrell.com/history/jcookO1.htm (last visited Oct.
22, 2002). The instructor had a rubber tube known as a "gos-

II.

PROVIDING THE MISSING PIECES FOR
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATORS - A BRIEF

HISTORY
The earliest airplanes did not have an electrical
system, let alone a radio or recorders. If the airplane had more than one seat, communications
between the occupants occurred through either
hand signals or a "gosport," a rubber tube
through which an instructor pilot could talk to his
or her student.'" After electric generators were
developed for aircraft, radios and a never-ending
collection of technological gadgets followed,
7
which now include satellite-based navigation,'
18
satellite-based communications and digital data
links used for air-to-ground communications, 19
and the FDRs and CVRs that are the mainstay of
modern aircraft accident investigation followed.
Aircraft accident investigation has evolved from
cursory and ineffectual efforts to find the cause of
an accident2" to a very painstaking and technical
process involving investigators from a wide variety
of disciplines using sophisticated techniques and
technologies. 2 1 From the industry's early begin-

INC., SATCOM, AERONAUTICAL

http://www.emssatcom.com/solutions/
s_aeronautical.asp (last visited Apr. 17, 2002) (providing
multiple links to one manufacturer's satellite communications products).
19 See, e.g., ARINC PRODUCTS & SERVICES, GLOBALINK
SERVICES, at http://www.arinc.coin/products/globalink/inSOLUTIONS,

at

port" that he could use to talk to the student. One end was
attached to the ear flap on the student's leather helmet, and
the other end was a small funnel into which the instructor

dex.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2002). The data link services
used by airlines are used primarily to communicate with dis-

yelled. The student could not talk to the instructor; he could
only shake his head "yes" or "no." Communications between

tenance matters, as well as with automated services that pro-

instructor and student could have been lost because of the

links provide high speed, high capacity communications

noise from the engine and the rush of the wind through the
cockpit. Id.

without congesting traditional voice frequencies. Id.
20
See generally GEORGE E. HOPKINS, FLYING THE LINE:

17

See SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION, NAVIGATION IN THE AIR,

at http://www.nasm.si.edu/galleries/gps/airnav.html (last
visited Apr. 17, 2002). The current generation of transport
aircraft use the satellite-based Global Positioning System
("GPS") for precise navigation. Id. See also U.S. NAVAL OBSERVATORY, NAVSTAR GPS OPERATIONS:
USNO NAVSTAR
GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM, at http://tycho.usno.navy.mil/

patchers and maintenance centers on operational and mainvide weather and airport-related information. These data

THE

FIRsT HALF CENTURY OF THE AIR LINE PILOrS ASSOCIATION 3841 (1982) [hereinafter HOPKINS] (describing early efforts in
aircraft accident investigation and the erratic results caused

by unsophisticated techniques and other shortcomings).
21 One need only compare an accident investigation report from an earlier time with a contemporary report to see
the level of sophistication of modern technology and tech-
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nings in the 1920s through the late 1950s, the
only way to ensure an onboard eyewitness account
of an aircraft accident was pilot survival. Without a
reliable observer, most accident reconstruction
was left to educated guesses and speculation..2 2
For instance, after World War II, there was a
string of speculative efforts to pin down the cause
of a series of accidents involving cargo compartment fires in DC-6 aircraft. Consensus had been
building that these and other similar accidents in
this time frame all were due to pilot error. 231 Accident investigators did not have enough information to piece together what the root causes might
be. In October 1947, a United DC-6 became the
next victim of in-flight fire resulting in a crash
near Bryce Canyon, Utah. Before they died in the
crash, the pilots were able to communicate, via
their radio, enough detailed information about
what was happening aboard the aircraft for investigators to begin to piece together what was bringing down so many of the new generation of pressurized aircraft.2 4 The next month, an American
DC-6 had a similar fire, but landed safely.2 5

Based on the information provided by the
doomed United crew and the information derived
from the wreckage in the United and American
incidents, accident investigators determined that
21 6
the problem was a design flaw in the fuel system.

Under certain circumstances, when fuel was transferred between two particular fuel tanks, fuel
niques. Examples are the report of two DC-6 crashes in 1947,
which take up only 12 typewritten pages, and the report of
the crash of TWA Flight 800 in 1996, which is 425 pages long.

See

CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT: UNITED AIRLINES, INC., BRYCE CANYON, UTAH, OCr. 24,
1947, AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., GALLUP NEW MEXICO, Nov.
11, 1947, available at http://www.pr.erau.edu/-case/library/

reportsl/40.html (released Dec. 21, 1948) [hereinafter ACCIDENT REPORT, BRYCE CANYON];

NTSB,

ACCIDENT INVESTIGA-

TION REPORT: IN-FLIGHT BREAKUP OVER THE ATLANTIC OCEAN

TRANS WORLD AIRLINES FLIGrr 800, BOEING 747-131, N93119,
NEAR EAST MORICHES, NEW YORK, JULY 17, 1996, at http://
www.ntsb.gov/ptLblictn/2000/AAR0003.pdf (released Aug.

23, 2000).
22 See generally HOPKINS, supra note 20.
See id. at 179-80.
24
Id. at 179.
25
Id. at 180.
26 Id. at 179.
27 Id.
28
See generally ACCIDENT REPORT, BRYCE CANYON, supra
note 21. The Civil Aeronautics Board ("CAB") was the predecessor to the NTSB responsible for accident investigation and
safety promotion. These functions were transferred to the
NTSB at its creation in October 1966. The CAB was abolished in 1985 in the wake of the deregulation of the airline
23
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would enter the intake of the cabin heater, causing it to catch fire. 2 7 The investigators discovered
these deficiencies and also found that there were
no published crew procedures for fuel transfer
that could have prevented the fires. 28 As a result,
the Civil Aeronautics Administration 2 9 grounded
all DC-6s 11 and brought about needed changes.
The radioed reports from the United crew and
the survival of the American crew were serendipitous. Several aircraft, however, were lost before
the problem was found.-1
Many of those aircraft might not have been put
in harm's way had there been a CVR or a 21st century FDR to record what really happened to the
downed aircraft, enabling a more timely identification of the cause and, most importantly, a viable
fix. However, more than a decade passed before
FDRs were mandated in commercial aircraft, and
it was two decades before voice recorders were introduced to provide the often crucial pieces to
the aircraft accident puzzle.
In response to the growing number of unsolved
aircraft accidents and the need for more information to aid in accident investigations, the U.S. gov32
ernment first mandated FDRs in the late 1950s,
and by 1964, CVRs were required in "large airplanes used by air carriers or commercial operators." The FAA's sole intent was to provide information to aid aviation accident investigators in determining the "cause and nature of the emerindustry. See

NATIONAL ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMINISTRATION,
RESEARCH RooM, RECORDS OF THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD

[CAB], at http://www.archives.gov/researchroom/federalrecords-guide/civil-aeronautics-board-rgl97.html
(last visited Apr. 17, 2002).
29

See

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION,

A BRIEF HIS-

TORY OF THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION AND ITS PRED-

ECESSOR AGENCIES, available at http://wwwl.faagov/index.cfm/apa/1271/21194882-E4F (last visited Apr. 17,
2002). The Civil Aeronautics Administration ("CAA") was the
forerunner of today's Federal Aviation Administration
("FAA"). In the post-WWII era, the CAA was a branch of the
Department of Commerce and was responsible for air traffic
control, certification of pilots and aircraft, safety enforce-

ment, airway development and the administration of a financial assistance program designed to promote development of
civil airports. Id.
0 HOPKINS, supra note 20, at 180.
31
32

Id.

See George Hayllar, The Histoly of Flight Data Recorders
('I7)Rs), available at http://www.bath.ac.uk/-en8gkh/ghistory.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2002).

'3 Installation of Cockpit Voice Recorders in Large Airplanes Used by an Air Carrier or Commercial Operator, 29
Fed. Reg. at 8401.
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2003]

gency." 3 4 This intent was made even clearer just

prior to implementation:
The [FAA] agrees that its only purpose in requiring the
recorded information is to assist in determining the
cause of accidents or occurrences, and that the information should be used only in connection with the in... and not in a
vestigation of accidents or occurrences
35
civil penalty or certificate action.

Cockpit voice recorders, often referred to as
"black boxes," 36 come in several versions, depending largely on their date of manufacture and the
FAA specifications at the time. Traditional CVRs
typically record continuously on a loop of magnetic tape beginning at the CVR's activation prior
to the checklists the pilot is required to go
through before engine start.3 7 It records information via an overhead microphone ("cockpit area
microphone"), which captures voice conversation
as well as the ambient noises associated with the
movement of levers and switches, engines and
other airplane components. 38 It also collects information directly from the pilots' headsets so
that radio transmissions are included, and it collects information from oxygen mask microphones
so that communications will not be lost while pilots are using the masks. The tape typically can
hold 30 minutes of sound recording and, therefore, retains only the last 30 minutes or so prior to
the recorder being shut down-either by being
turned off or because power was lost for another
reason, such as a crash.3 9 The newest models incorporate digital technology, recording on mem34
Installation of Cockpit Voice Recorders in Large Airplanes Used by an Air Carrier or Commercial Operator, 28
Fed. Reg. 13786 (Dec. 18, 1963) (explaining that a number
of accidents that at time were "characterized by sudden extreme emergencies, so that the flight crew could not communicate with ground facilities. In those cases where the crew
did not survive, information they may have been able to give
concerning the cause and nature of the emergency was
lost").
35
Installation of Cockpit Voice Recorders in Large Airplanes Used by an Air Carrier or Commercial Operator, 29
Fed. Reg. at 8401.
'36 "Black boxes" is a misnomer. To enable investigators
to locate CVRs and their companion FDRS more easily in aircraft wreckage, they most commonly are painted bright orange or, sometimes, bright yellow. See 14 C.F.R. §§23.1457,
1459 (2001).
37 14 C.F.R. §91.609 (2001).
38
See COCKPIT VOICE RECORDERS AND FLIGHT DATA RE-

CORDERS,

supra note 1.

39

See id.

40

See id.
See id.

41

One "G" is equal to the force exerted by gravity on a
body at rest. Christopher Hess, High-Tech Anti-G Suits, FLUG
42

ory chips instead of tape, and can hold two hours
40
of sound in digital format.
Cockpit voice recorders are built to withstand
incredible extremes of impact shock, temperature
and pressure. 4' The typical modern CVR must be
42
"'
able to sustain an impact force of 3400 "G.
They must also be able to withstand a fire of 1100
degrees Celsius (2012 degrees Fahrenheit) for at
least 30 minutes and remain undamaged to a
depth of 20,000 feet underwater. The specifications also call for an underwater locator beacon
43
capable of operating continuously for 30 days.
III.

THE TENSION - POTENTIAL USES FOR
CVR RECORDINGS

Along with the introduction of CVRs on U.S.
airliners, there also came four potential uses for
their output: (1) accident investigation; (2) public
airing by the media; (3) litigation; and (4) criminal investigation and prosecution. The first was an
intended use; the others were not.
A.

Accident Investigation

The value of CVRs became apparent from the
beginning of their use. On December 20, 1967,
shortly after the mandate for CVR installation in
the domestic air fleet, 44 a Delta Airlines ("Delta")
DC-8 on a pilot training flight crashed during a
practice emergency approach that simulated two
at http://www.flug-revue.rotor.com/FRheft/
FRH9908/FR9908d.htm (last updated July 12, 1999) [hereinafter Hess]. For comparison, the typical airliner is limited to
about 2.5 G in flight; the most aggressive roller coasters exert
no more than about 4.5 G; an airplane occupant not accustomed to "pulling G" and not wearing a g-suit will black out
at between 5 and 6 G; modern fighter aircraft are limited to
about 9 G; and a 160 pound driver crashing into an immovable object at 30 miles per hour will sustain between 20 and 30
G, depending on whether the seatbelt he is wearing stretches
or not. See Unofficial Guide to Six bags Over Georgia, Roller Coasters, at http://zuben77.tripod.com/unofficialguidetosixflagsovergeorgia/id2.html; Hess, supra; Jeff Ethell, Jeff Ethell's
Pireps-F-16 Falcon, at http://www.airspacemag.com/asm/
web/special/ethell/pirep6.htnl (last updated Apr. 20,
REVUE ONLINE,

2001);

HYPERPiHYSICS, FORCE ON DRIVER IN EXAMPLE CAR
CRASH, at http://hyperphysics.phy-astr.gsu.edu/hbase/
carcr2.html (all last visited Apr. 17, 2002).
43 See COCKPIT VOICE RECORDERS AND FLIGHT DATA RECORDERS, supra note 1.
44 See Installation of Cockpit Voice Recorders in Large
Airplanes Used by an Air Carrier or Commercial Operator,

29 Fed. Reg. at 8401. Cockpit Voice Recorders were required

to be installed in all large jets byJuly 1, 1966 and in all large,
pressurized four-engine airplanes by January 1, 1967. Id.
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inoperative engines. 45 Based primarily on the

cockpit conversations extracted from the newly installed CVRs, accident investigators were able to
conclude that two of the principal reasons for the
accident were "errors in judgment by the captaintrainee and inadequate supervision and exercise
of command on the part of the instructor."4, This

is an example of the most basic type of analysis
expected to come from CVRs-being able to analyze both the words spoken by cockpit occupants
and the context in which they are spoken. In this
case, the trainee was a very experienced captain
being trained to qualify to operate a new aircraft
by another very experienced captain. 4 7 It was evident from the CVR recording that the training environment was relaxed, probably because the
48
trainee and the instructor were essentially equal.
This led the investigators to conclude that the informal instructor-student relationship resulted in
a less attentive atmosphere than that which might
have prevailed had the trainee been less experienced.

49

The tones of the few suggestions given by the instructor
were in a mild prompting manner. There appeared to
be complete confidence in the student's ability to overcome any problem, including the drastically reduced
airspeed. There was no apprehension manifest until
the captain-trainee himself recognized the loss 5of control, at which point the accident was inevitable. 0

Exactly a month before the Delta training accident, on November 20, 1967, a Trans World Airlines ("TWA") Convair 880 four-engine passenger
jet crashed during its approach to the Greater
Cincinnati Airport, located in Covington, Kentucky. 5 1 The investigation of this accident vividly
demonstrated that CVRs could produce more
than cockpit conversations. "In an effort to determine engine power used during the latter stages

of the flight.., the original CVR tape was provided to the engine manufacturer for an analysis
of engine-generated sound spectral frequency relationships. Several prominent resonances were
detected on the accident CVR tape."5

2

Sophisti-

cated analysis contributed to a better understanding of thrust requirements and thrust management during the approach, demonstrating the
wealth of additional information which may be
available on a CVR tape.
NTSB investigators used a similar analysis of the
CVR tapes to help determine the likely cause of
the crash of Air Florida Flight 90 on January 13,
1982.5 3 The aircraft crashed into the 14th Street
Bridge across an ice-covered Potomac River immediately after takeoff from Washington's National Airport. 54 Sound spectrum analysis of the

CVR tape allowed analysts to determinate that the
engines were not developing the thrust required
for takeoff.5 5 This information promulgated further tests at Boeing, the aircraft's manufacturer,
that demonstrated that the suspected icing of an
engine sensor, called an engine inlet probe, resulted in an undetected reduced thrust in the
56
range that the spectrum analysis had indicated.
Combined with the conversations recorded on
the CVR, this critical information allowed investigators to draw conclusions based on hard facts
57
rather than mere speculation.
Cockpit voice recorder tapes have also revealed
inadequacies in training and procedures. In 1974,
a TWA 727 crashed into a ridge near Round Hill,
Virginia in part because of a misinterpretation by
the pilots of air traffic control terminology. 58 As a
result, the FAA changed its relevant air traffic con-

45 See 14 C.F.R. §121.424 (2001). Much airline training is
now conducted in high fidelity aircraft flight simulators
tinder Appendix H to Federal Aviation Regulations Part 121
- Advanced Simulation, codified in 14 C.F.R. §121, app. H
(2001), not only to save money, but to avoid exposure to accidents brought about by practicing emergency procedures in
real aircraft. For example, windshear training is so inherently

TrUCiv, 18, available at http://Anelia.db.erau.edu/reports/
ntsb/aar/AAR69-05.pdf (released Nov. 20, 1967) [hereinafter AIRCRAFr ACCIDENT REPORT, TRANS WORLD AIRLINES].
52
See id.at 18.
53 See NTSB, AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT: AIR FLORIDA,
INC., BOEINc 737-222, N62AF, COLLISION WITH 14 TH STREET

dangerous that it is required only in simulators. Id.
46
See NTSB, AIRCRAFr ACCIDENT REPORT: DELTA

D.C., JAN. 13, 1982, available at http://www.airdisaster.com/
reports/ntsb/AAR82-08.pdf (released Aug. 10, 1982).
54
i.at 5.
55
Id.at 80.
56
See id.at 23.
57 See id.

LINES, INC.

DC-8, N803E,

KENNER, LOUISIANA,

AIR-

NTSB/AAR-67

AG, available at http://www.airdisaster.com/reports/ntsb/
AAR67-AG.pdf (released Dec. 20, 1967).
47
48

Id.at 15.
Id.

58

50

Id.
Id.

51

See NTSB,

49

AIRLINES,

BRIDGE, NEAR WASHINGTON NATIONAL AIRPORT, WASHINGTON,

See NTSB, AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT: TRANS WORLD
INC., BOEING 727-231, N54328, BERinVILLE, VIR-

AIRLINES,

cINIA, DEC. 1, 1974, 1, available at http://ameilia.db.erau.
INC.,

AIRCRAvI'

CONVAIR

ACCIIWFNT REPORT: TRANS WORLD

880, N821TW,

CONSTANCE,

KEN-

edu/ reports/ntsh/aar/AAR75-16.pdf

1975).

(released Nov. 26,

"Privileged Communications?"

2003]

trol procedures. 59
1.

Straying From Original Intent

Just as the requirement for installation of CVRs
became effective, Congress passed the Freedom
of Information Act ("FOIA") ,60 which made much
government-held information accessible to the
general public. In its original incarnation, the

FOIA envisioned a pro-disclosure bias by limiting
exemptions:
Nothing in this section authorizes withholding of information or limiting the availability of records to the public except as specifically stated in this section, nor shall
this section
be authority to withhold information from
61
Congress.

This bias in favor of disclosure has been echoed
repeatedly in court opinions. 62 With the enactment of the FOIA and increased interest on the
part of the media, the floodgates were opened. As
one commentator noted:
[T]he use of CVR information began to broaden beyond what was originally contemplated ....Portions of
CVR transcripts began appearing in the news media,
which resulted in premature speculation and misinformation as to the cause of the accident. Often the transcripts that were published, while perhaps interesting
or sensational, had no relevance whatsoever to the accident. Such media stories often resulted in unwarranted
and unfair accusations being made against [those] involved in the accident.6

In 1982, in response to this divergence from the
original intent for the use of CVR recordings,
Congress passed legislation intended to rein in
the abuses while ensuring that the public still had
64
access to pertinent information.
59
60

Id.

5 U.S.C. §552 (2000).
61 See S. Res. 1160, 89th Cong. (1966) (enacted), available
at http://gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/nsa/FOIA/FOIAACT66.pdf
(last visited Apr. 17, 2002).
62
See, e.g., Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Robbins, 437 U.S.
214, 220 (1978) (quoting Dep't of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S.
352, 361 (1976)) (stating that the FOIA's "'basic policy' is in
favor of disclosure").
63 James W. Johnson, Cockpit Voice Recorder: Solely For Accident Investigations, LITIGxION IN AVIATION, 1991, A.B.A. SEC.
TORT & INS. PRAc-r. & DIv. FOR PROF'L. EDUC., §C at 3 [here-

inafter Johnson].
64 Independent Safety Board Act Amendments of 1982,
Pub. L. No. 97-309, 96 Star. 1453 (1982) (codified as
amended at 49 U.S.C. §1905 (1990)). Title 49 has been partially revised, placing CVR restrictions in a new section. The
current citation is 49 U.S.C. §1154 (2001).
65 See H.R. CONF. REP. 97-864, at 3 (1982), reprinted in
1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3042, 3043. This provision states:
[Tihe [NTSB] shall withhold from public disclosure
cockpit voice recorder recordings and transcriptions in-

2. Back Toward Original Intent.
The legislation, an amendment to a five-year ex65
tension of the Aviation Insurance Program
("war risk insurance program"), requires the
NTSB to withhold CVR recordings and transcripts
associated with ongoing accident investigations.
The NTSB is then required to make relevant portions of the transcriptsavailable to the public at the
Board's public hearing, but no later than 60 days
after the accident or after CVR recovery, whichever is later. 66 The clear intent was to give the
NTSB an undisturbed 60-day window to assess the
contents of the CVR tapes before the "relevant
and pertinent" portions of the transcript are re67
leased to the public.

This legislation did not quell premature leaks
of transcripts or copies of the tapes themselves. In
1987, even before the NTSB's CVR group had its
first meeting, 6 the New York Times published excerpts of CVR data from a Northwest Airlines accident in Detroit. 69 In addition, at least one state
court made a CVR tape available through discov76
ery without placing a protective order on its use.
As a result, the tape, intended solely for use in accident investigations, found its way outside this
realm. In one of the more egregious misuses of a
CVR tape, a Texas state court ordered the release
of a tape through discovery. The tape ended up in
the hands of the local news media and was ultimately picked-up and aired by the national affili71
ate.
In the midst of this tug-of-war are the pilots.
Their conversations are recorded on the CVR
volving flight crew communications that are associated
with accidents investigated by the Board. The Board is
required to make available to the public those portions
of the transcriptions of such communications that the
Board deems relevant and pertinent to the accident, at
the time of the Board's public hearing on the accident,
and in any event no later than 60 days following the accident. In the event that the CVR is not recovered immediately after the accident, the conferees intend that the
Board have 60 days after recovery of the CVR before release. The conferees emphasize that this amendment
would not affect the Board's current practice of sharing
CVR information with parties to the investigation. Id.
66
67
68

Id.
Id.

SeeJohnson, supra note 63, at 4.
See NTSB, NTSB ACCIDENT SUMMARY DCA87MA046:
NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC. ACCIDENT ON JULY 16, 1987 AT
ROMULUS, MI, at http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev-id=
20001213X31759&key=l (released Aug. 1987).
69

70

SeeJohnson, supra note 63, at 4.

71

Id. at 5.
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tapes. While initially reluctant to become the subjects of eavesdropping, pilots recognized the benefits reaped in accident investigations and were
eventually won over with assurances that the CVR
tapes would be used solely for this purpose. 72 As
early as 1969, the Executive Board of the Air Line
Pilots Association ("ALPA"), which represents the
majority of airline pilots in the United States, endorsed the use of CVRs, with the proviso that their
use be limited to accident investigators. 73 At the
same time, ALPA continued to reaffirm "its longstanding position in opposition to the use of aircraft crash recorders and cockpit voice recorders
74
for purposes other than accident investigation.
In addition to Congress, the FAA, NTSB and a
majority of U.S. pilots, many in the international
aviation arena share this view. The International
Civil Aviation Organization ("ICAO") is a specialized agency of the United Nations,7 5 formed "to
secure international co-operation . .

.

[in the]

highest possible degree of uniformity in regulations and standards, procedures and organization
regarding civil aviation matters.

76

The ICAO's

policy is that records, including specifically "cockpit voice recordings and transcripts from such recordings," are not available "for purposes other
than accident or incident investigation, unless the
appropriate authority for the administration of
justice in that State determines that their disclosure outweighs the adverse domestic and interna72

AIR LINE PILOTs ASSOCIATION,

MANUAL,

SECTION

80-ENGINEERING

Id. at 80-72.

75

See INTERNATIONAL CIviL AVIATION ORGANIZATION, CHI-

at http://www.icao.int/cgi/goto.pl?icao/

en/history.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2002).
CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION,

FOUN-

DATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIl. AVIATION ORGANIZATION

(ICAO), at http://www.icao.int/icao/en/ro/eurnat/history02.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2002).
77 See ANNEX 13 TO TIE CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL
AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT

AND INCIDENT

INVESTIGATION

§5.12 (International Civil Aviation Organization, 9th ed.
2001).
78 The most recent differences were submitted by the
U.S. to reflect U.S. differences with the Ninth Edition of ANNEX

In New Zealand, in response to a successful po.lice warrant to seize the CVR from a 1995 aircraft
accident, 79 the government enacted new law reflecting the ICAO policy by protecting products of
flight recorders and the privity of accident investigations.8 0 The law limits use of recorders to accident investigations, prohibits their use in legal or
administrative proceedings and prevents their use
by the media. 8 1 The legislation was forward looking because it included emerging technologies
such as cockpit video recorders.8 2 Current U.S.
law proscribes a similar release of video recordings,8 even though video recorders are not yet required in cockpits.8 4 The International Federation of Air Line Pilot Associations ("IFALPA") also
endorses the use of CVRs under conditions very
85
much like those permitted in the U.S.

Why should the pilot's opinion matter? Why
should society need a pilot's "permission" to record their professional activities? The answer is
that CVRs, while serving a vital function when
used as intended, can also constitute an otherwise
unwarranted intrusion on an individual's expectation of privacy in the workplace. The Supreme
Court has held that even a public employee has "a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his office,"86
on New Zealand's North Island crashed into a ridgeline during an instrument approach while the pilots were
troubleshooting a malfunctioning landing gear. Four passengers and the flight attendant were killed. At the same time
the New Zealand Government Transport Accident Investigation Commission was investigating the accident, the police
sought and obtained the CVR tape as part of an investigation
to determine if the pilots were criminally liable in the operation of the aircraft. At the time, CVRs were not even required
in New Zealand. Id.
80 1d.
81 Id.
82
See NEW ZEALAND AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, NEW
ZEALAND HAS NEW AIR SAFETY LAW,at http://www.nzalpa.org.
nz/cgi-bin/nzalpa/display?filename=technical/newlaw.html

Id.

AVIATION,

78
current U.S. law.

DHC-8 twin turboprop aircraft enroute to Palmerton North

74

INTERNATIONAL

filed "differences" to the ICAO policy to reflect

80-71

AIR SAFETY,

73

76

future investigations." 77 The United States has

INT'L-ADMINISTRATIV],
AN)

(October 2001).

CAGO CONVENTION,

tional impact such action may have on that or any

13 TO THE CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL AvIATION,

which became effective November 1, 2001. See Memorandum
to the Secretary General of the International Civil Aviation
Organization (Nov. 1, 2001) (on file with this author) (delineating the differences between the Ninth Edition of ANNEX 13 TO THE CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL AVIATION and

specific U.S. regulations and practices).
79 See Capt. Paul McCarthy, Kiwis, CLOP, and the CVR, AIR
LINE PILOT, Jan. 2000, at 22. On June 6, 1995, an Ansett

&bground (last visited Apr. 17, 2002).
83" See 49 U.S.C. §1114(c)(1) (2000) (stating that the
"Board may not disclose publicly any part of a cockpit voice
or video recorder recording or transcript of oral communications by and between flight crew members and ground stations related to an accident or incident investigated by the

Board").
84 See id.
85

See INTERNATIONAL FEI)ERATION OF AIR LINE PILoTs,

POLICY MANUAL,

86

§5.7.3.

See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 718 (1987).
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and, to a professional pilot, the cockpit is their office. Pilots have acquiesced to having that privacy
invaded by a CVR, but only for the purpose of accident investigation.
When the subject of CVRs comes up in discussions among pilots, a comparison inevitably arises
with the medical community, which, for example,
has no mandatory recorders in the operating
room. Within the period 1982-2000, the year 1996
posted the highest number of deaths caused by
aircraft accidents in scheduled U.S. air carrier service. 87 There were three fatal accidents, causing
the deaths of 342 persons.8 8 None of the accidents were attributed to pilot error.8 9 In contrast,
a study published in 2000 by the National Academy of Sciences ("NAS") estimated that between
44,000 and 98,000 people die annually in the
United States from medical errors that occur in
hospitals. 90 The study also acknowledged that the
aviation industry must be doing something right
because by the early 1990s, "the U.S. airline fatality rate was less than one-third the rate experienced in mid century. In 1998, there were no
deaths in the United States in commercial aviation."9 ' Faced with these statistics, pilots wonder
why they have had to give up their privacy while
members of the medical community have not.
The NAS study does not discuss the possibility
of recording devices for the medical community,
but others have thought of it. For instance, in
London, a prototype Clinical Data Recorder
("CDR") is being used in an experimental operat92
ing theater at Imperial College.
In the same way that flight recorders monitor vital data
that can help accident investigators identify the cause
of aircraft crashes, the operating theatre "black box"
would record who was present and what they were doing, monitor patients' vital signs, equipment being
used, record conversations, and track personnel and
even individual hand movements. 9 3
87

1982

See NTSB,
THROUGH

TABLE 6: ACCIDENTS, FATALITIES, AND RATES,

2001,

FOR

U.S.

AIR

CARRIERS

OPERATING

But, notwithstanding the benefits of CVRs, the
medical community is aware of the problems that
have followed CVRs into the cockpit; the results
would be the same if CDRs were used to monitor
physicians' activities. An article for the Health
Law and Policy Institute at the University of Houston Law Center sums up the problems that would
accompany introduction of CDRs to medical facilities.
One potential problem with the widespread use of
CDRs is that the information collected could be used
for purposes other than improving medical quality and

assuring patient safety. The information collected
could be used to promote medical malpractice suits. Pa-

tients who are not satisfied with a surgical outcome
could potentially build a9 4lawsuit around the information contained in CDRs.
As a result, health care workers would be unlikely
to embrace CDRs monitoring them, despite benefits to patients. The medical community would
fear misuse of the tapes and unauthorized invasions of their privacy.
In a recent article touting the dramatic potential benefits of re-creations and animations in the
courtroom, Richard Schaden dramatizes the impact of tools like CVRs and CDRs.
On final approach, a 737 rolls out of control and dives
into the ground, killing all aboard. A plane with no hydraulic control attempts a high-speed emergency landing. As the plane touches down, it begins to cartwheel
and the plane rips apart into fiery shards of wreckage.
These words inspire powerful and tragic images, but
none so powerful as a re-creation of the last five minutes of the flight, accompanied by the actual audiofrom the

cockpit voice recorder.The video depicts the breakup of a
shot by
plane, followed by actual footage of the9 5 crash
"
an amateur photographer at the scene.

There is no doubt that this type of description
would have a very dramatic impact in the courtroom and that many attorneys would relish the
chance to have actual CVR audio and even video
available for their own use.16 Airline pilots, how(1999)).
92

See Black Box for Operating Rooms,

REUTERS

HEALTH,

at
http://www.ntsb.gov/aviation/Table6.htm (last visited Apr.

Aug. 25, 2001 available at http://www.drkoop.com/dyncon/

17, 2002).

Id.
joseph J. Wang, Black Boxes in the O.?, at http://
www.law.uh.edu/healthlawperspectives/MedicalProfessionals/01 1004Blackbox.html (Oct. 4, 2001).
95
Richard F. Schaden, Making Them fly: Re-Creations and

UNDER 14 C.F.R. 121,

88

See NTSB,

SCHEDULED

SERVICE

(AIRLINES),

93

AVIATION: ACCIDENT DATABASE

&

SYNOPSES,

at http://www.ntsb.gov/NTSB/query.asp (last visited Apr.
17, 2002) (providing a searchable database containing information about civil aviation accidents and selected incidents
from 1962 to the present).
89
90

article.asp?at=N&id=13137 (last visited Apr. 17, 2002).

See id.
See INSTITUTE

OF MEDICINE,

To

ERR IS HUMAN: BUILD-

ING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM (Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 2000).
Id. at 5 (citation omitted) (citing DONALD M. BERWICK
91
& LUCIAN L. LEAPE, REDUCING ERRORS IN MEDICINE 136-37

94

Animations in Aviation Litigation, in 2 Assoc. of Trial Lawyers
of America (ATLA)-CLE 1733 (2001) (this article was in-

cluded in the Annual Convention Reference Materials for
ATLA's Aviation Law Section) (emphasis added).
96 The accidents alluded to above were real accidents
that occurred at a time when actual CVR audiotapes were not

COMMLAW CONSPECTUS

ever, are disturbed by such possibilities. It is potentially their dying words that would be broadcast in the courtroom for their families and,
shockingly, their local television affiliates to hear.
That was not the original intent of pilots' acquiescence to the introduction of CVRs into their cockpits.

97

In order to preserve the pilots' expectations of
privacy, and to restrict use of CVR tape recordings
to their originally intended use, Congress
amended the Independent Safety Board Act
("ISBA") in 1990, formulating a bright line rule to
clearly define the permissible uses of CVRs and
their products.118
3.

The Bright Line Rule

Congress' intent in adopting the new amendment was to "restrict the ability of litigants to misuse the recording or transcription in a lawsuit by
setting standards for discovery. ' 1 9 Thus, the law
severely restricts access to CVR tapes and transcripts outside the realm of accident investigation.'1 Litigants are granted access to tapes only
if a fairjudicial proceeding cannot be had without
them and then only with a limiting protective order."1 Being balanced is the promise that the information gathered in the cockpit would be used
as strictly controlled as they are now. See id.
97 See O'Connor,480 U.S. at 718.
98 See Independent Safety Board Act Amendments of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-641, 104 Stat. 4654 (1990) (codified as
amended at 49 U.S.C. App. 1905 (1990)) [hereinafter ISBA
Amendments of 1990]. Title 49 has been partially revised,
placing these restrictions in a new section. The current citation is 49 U.S.C. §1154 (2000).
99 See Id.
This amendment limits release of CVR information, specifies when it can be released, and permits discovery of the
transcription and recording only in certain limited circumstances. Section 306 of the Independent Safety Board Act
provides that CVR recordings and transcripts are not to be
released, except that portions of the transcriptions of oral
communications by and between the flight crew members
and ground stations are to be made available to the public at
the time of the public hearing or no later than 60 days following an accident or incident tinder investigation. The amendment also changes section 306 to restrict the ability of litigants to misuse the recording or transcription in a lawsuit by
setting standards for discovery and requiring that, if discovery
of non-public portions of a recording or transcript is obtained, a protective order limiting the use of the information
to that proceeding must be issued. It also prohibits dissemination
of the recording or portion to anyone who does not need the information for the proceeding. This provision is intended to eliminate the
use of such information except to ensure that litigants are able to
receive a fair trial.
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strictly for accident investigation, and the realization that, if a fair judicial proceeding cannot be had
without them, access to the information should be
limited. i1 12 Not everyone understands this balancing test. For example, one commentator believes
that requiring the NTSB to release transcripts creates "an enormous loophole" by making them discoverable. "' This perspective fails to recognize
the very strict language that governs discovery. 104
Moreover, information of real use is already available in the NTSB's public docket; hearing the recording in chambers is not likely to enrich discovery.
When he signed the 1990 ISBA changes into
law, President George H.W. Bush commented
that "[i]t is important to protect these materials
from sensationalism and unwarranted disclosure,
but it is also important that courts provide prompt
and complete disclosure to litigants with an interest in judicial proceedings involving aircraft accidents."' 5 Given the strict constraints put on discovery of CVR tapes and the non-public portions
of their transcripts, it is facially apparent that
"prompt and complete disclosure" is not part of
Congress' intent.
The ISBA amendments' additional restrictions
foreclose access to information through the
FOIA. Despite the FOIA's pro-disclosure bias, 1°6
In two incidents outlined in testimony before the Committee ...

the transcription in one case and the record-

ing in another case were released to the public in an
inappropriate manner. All parties to an accident investigation recognize both the rights to privacy of the individual

crewmembers and the need to conduct a fair investigation.
This section seeks to maintain a balance between those
interests. The section is not intended, however, to restrict the parties to the investigation in any way from access to the CVR information, prior to public disclosure,
for purposes of the investigation.
Id. at 104 Stat. 6381 (emphasis added).
i00
This is more in line with the original intent of the law
governing CVRs. See Installation of Cockpit Voice Recorders
in Large Airplanes Used by an Air Carrier or Commercial
Operator, 29 Fed. Reg. at 8401.
101 See ISBA Amendments of 1990, 104 Stat. 4655.
I02

Id.

Donald C. Massey, Proposed On-Board Recordersfor Motor Carriers:FosteringSafer Highways or Unfairly Tilting the Litigation Playing Field?, 24 S. ILL. U. L.J. 453, 461 (2000).
104
See H.R. CONF. REP. 97-864, at 3043. The "enormous
03

loophole" is not a loophole at all, but is in concert with the
original intent to treat actual recordings differently than
transcripts and other data.
15
See President's Signing Statement, ISBA Amendments
of 1990, 104 Stat. 6381-1.
1(6

See Robbins, 437 U.S. at 220.
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the 1990 ISBA changes fit precisely within one of
the FOIA exemptions."'

7

The mandate to disclose

information under the FOJA does not apply to
matters that are: "specifically exempted from disclosure by statute .

.

. provided that such statute

(A) requires that the matters be withheld from
the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types
of matter to be withheld."''° Thus, CVR recordings cannot be reached via a FOIA request.
B.

Their Dying Utterances

Congress has twice revisited the original legislation in order to restrict the use of CVR tapes and
transcripts to the originally stated purpose of aircraft accident investigation. The FAA does not use
CVRs to extract civil penalties;" 9 discovery is
strictly limited to circumstances where a fair judicial proceeding cannot be had without them; and,
the FOIA further limits the availability of CVR information. Nevertheless, there is still an issue of
disclosure that lies outside the area of accident investigation. Simply stated, pilots and others are
107
See Rose, 425 U.S. at 361 (emphasizing that the FOIA
exemptions must be narrowly construed).
108 5 U.S.C. §552(b) (3) (2000).
109
14 C.F.R. §91. 6 0 9(g) (2000) (applying to flight operations in general); 14 C.F.R. §121.359(h) (2000) (applying to
air carrier operations).
110 Families normally are not privy to CVR tapes, but in
the aftermath of the crash of United Flight 93 in Pennsylvania on September 11, 2001, some family members asked
to hear the CVR tapes. The FBI-not the NTSB-agreed to
it. SeeJohn Curran, FBI to Let Relatives of light 93 Victims Hear

Cockpit Recordings, CHArTTANOOGA

TIMES/CHATANOOGA FREE

PRESS, Mar. 26, 2002, at A5:

"I don't know what I'm going to hear, but I need to hear
it," said Patrick Welsh, whose 49-year-old-wife, Deborah,
was the lead flight attendant on board. "It's going to be a
horrific thing to listen to. In some ways it may appear
almost masochistic, after what all of us have been
through. But you're trying to find a truth, trying to get
some more information about the events."
The National Transportation Safety Board, which investigates aviation accidents, has never allowed relatives to
listen to cockpit tapes, spokesman Ted Lopatkiewicz
said. Under federal law, the safety board cannot release
the tapes and can only give out transcripts during a public hearing or when a majority of factual reports on the
crash are completed, Lopatkiewicz said.
Welsh lauded the government's decision, saying it balanced family members' right to know with privacy considerations.

willing to tolerate the invasion of their privacy in
the interests of public safety. But they are not willing to tolerate an invasion so that their loved ones
can hear their dying screams on the evening
news,1 10 or so that their grieving survivors can be
sued for the pilots' alleged negligence. Over time,
however, portions of the transcripts germane to
an accident are released to the public, including
the media'
and interested attorneys. Little, if
anything, is gained by this wider distribution.
In the aftermath of a Delta 727 crash in Dallas
on August 31,.1988, a Texas state court ordered
the release of the CVR tape through discovery.' 12
It ended up being played on the evening news'"
and, more recently, has been available on the Internet. The airing of the tape on the evening news
preceded the ISBA amendments in 1990, which
placed tighter restrictions on the release of CVR
tapes and, in fact, is what gave rise to those
amendments.' 4 To the horror of survivors, however, some tapes still find their way to the public.
Foreign governments' accident investigations
often are not as restricted as those of U.S. agencies,I 15 and this can result in release of a CVR tape

to unintended recipients. Following the crash of
Under threat of lawsuits from the surviving relatives, the
FBI played the CVR tapes for family members on April 18,
2002. See David Snyder, FamiliesHearFlight 93's FinalMoments,
WASH. POST, April 19, 2002 at A3. It remains to be seen if
family members listening to cockpit events in the final moments of Flight 93 heard anything that will contribute to the
investigation or whether it merely whet the appetites of relatives of future victims and thereby opened a Pandora's box.
Id.
III The media's use of CVR transcripts is not limited to
news reporting and analysis. The 1998 book, The Black Box:
All-New Cockpit Voice Recorder Accounts of In-flight Accidents, edited by Malcolm MacPherson and published by Qtill, is an
updated compilation of CVR transcripts which the publisher
touts as providing "a heartbreaking, second-by-second accotnt of intense fear tempered by unyielding professionalism." See HARPERCOLLINS.COM, THE BLACK Box: ALL-NEW
COCKPIT VOICE RECORDER ACCOUNTS OF IN-FLIGHT ACCIDENTS,

at http://www.harpercollins.com/catalog/book_xml.asp?
isbn=0688158927 (last visited Oct. 30, 2002). Sarah Vowell, a
reviewer of the book says, "I confess, as a fan of detective
novels and detective movies and detective TV shows, I find
the question of how someone dies inherently fascinating. As
an audiophile, the very idea of recordings that offer the sound
of death is wildly titillating." Sarah Vowell, American Squirm:
Fear of Flying, SALON.COM, at http://archive.salon.com/ent/
music/vowe/1998/08/24vowe.litnil
(last visited Apr. 17,
2002) (emphasis in original).
112
SeeJohnson, supra note 63, at 5.
''3
Id.
114 Id.
115
See Press Release, Air Line Pilots Associ:,ti(iI, Pilots
Angered Over Use of Cockpit Voice Recorder on "Dateline:
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an American 757 during an approach into Cali,
Colombia on the night of December 20, 1995, an
agency of the Colombian government conducted
the post-crash investigation with technical assistance from the NTSB.1 6 Somehow, a copy of the
CVR audio tape ended up in the possession of the
NBC television network, which, despite requests
not to do so, aired portions of the tape as part of a
story on their program, Dateline:, on January 19,
2000.117 Since the NTSB is prohibited from releasing CVR tapes 1 and courts are severely restricted
from allowing their use in discovery,' 19 the tape
apparently had been obtained from an unofficial
source, leaving no method to prevent its broadcast. The airing of the tape was criticized by then
NTSB Chairman Jim Hall.' 2 0 Hall's criticism was

echoed
("APA"),

by the Allied
12 1

Pilots Association

which represents the American pilots,

and by ALPA. 122 The Cali accident is discussed in
more detail below.
There is also the issue of CVR ownership. At the
completion of an investigation, the CVR tape is returned to the aircraft's operator.125 While statutes
restrict what NTSB and the courts may do with
the CVR tape, 124 there are no such restrictions on
the tape's owner. Universal access afforded by the
Internet then becomes an issue. If a person enters
the appropriate search criteria into any competent Internet search engine, he will find a number
of Web sites that have actual CVR recordings.

NBC", at http://cf.alpa.org/internet/news/2000news/
nr00005.htm Uan. 19, 2000) (last visited Oct. 30, 2002)
[hereinafter Pilots Angered Over Use of Cockpit Voice Recorder on "Dateline: NBC"].
116 See Press Release, NTSB, Columbian Press ReleaseFactual Data Aircraft Accident Investigation (Dec. 28, 1995),

at http://www.rvs.ini-bielefeld.de/publications/lncidents/
DOCS/ComAndRep/Cali/cali-prelimreport.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2002).
117
Id.
118 See 49 U.S.C. §114(c) (1994).
1'9 See 49 U.S.C. §1154 (1994).
121
See Press Release, NTSB, Statement by NTSB Chairman Jim Hall on Broadcasting of Cockpit Voice Recorder
Tape (Jan. 19, 2000), at http://www.NTSB.gov/Pressrel/
2000/000119.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2002). Hall stated,
"The use of such a recording - however it was obtained - for
such a purpose is inappropriate. It does nothing to advance

the cause of aviation safety, and only serves to sensationalize
a tragedy." Id.
121

See

HOTLINE,

ALLIED PILOTS ASSOCIATION, APA INFORMATION
at http://www.alliedpilots.org/Public/Hotline/

prevhl.asp?id=20000120 (Jan. 20, 2000).
122
See Pilots Angered Over Use of Cockpit Voice Recorder on "Dateline: NBC," supra note 115.
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Some are innocuous, but some are grisly and not
for the faint of heart.
Bolstering the privacy interest argument are
two cases from the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit ("D.C. Circuit"). Section (b) (6) of the FOIA permits withholding of "personnel/medical and other files
disclosure of which would violate personal privacy." 12 5 Drawing from this wording, the D.C. Circuit held that the release of an autopsy report by
the Air Force would "shock the sensibilities of surviving kin" 12 6 and "constitute a 'clearly unwar-

ranted invasion of personal privacy.' "127
Six months after the destruction of the space
shuttle Challenger in 1986, which killed all seven
astronauts aboard, a reporter from the New York
Times submitted a FOIA request to NASA for transcripts and copies of all voice and data communications recorded on the ill-fated shuttle. In New
York Times v. National Aeronautics and Space Administration,'2

the reporter argued that the public

had a "strong interest"'129 in disclosure because it
was "the best available record of governmental activity" aboardthe Challenger in the moments just
prior to the accident.""' The reporter also argued
that the public "has a strong and legitimate interest in gaining a full understanding of the disaster,
and of the conduct of the agency and its employees in the events and activities during and after
that incident."''
The trial court ordered the release of the
What 'Dateline: NBC did was outrageous and absolutely
inexcusable. This is every airline pilot's worst nightmare,
to have what often turns out to be the last few minutes of
his life made public, not for any advancement of aviation
safety, but as an exploitative and sensationalistic public
spectacle on the airwaves. Id.
12-3 See NTSB INVESTIGATOR'S MANUAL, VOL. III - REGIONAL INVESTIGATIONS, at 3-148, available at http://amelia.db.erau.edu/onlinebkutp/1181.3.pdf (last visited Oct. 23,
2002) [hereinafter INVESTIGATOR'S MANUAL].
12'l
See 49 U.S.C. §1154 (1994).
I25 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(6) (2000). (emphasis added). The
FOIA at section 552(b) (3) also exempts from disclosure anything specifically exempted by statute "provided that such
statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the
public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or
refers to particular types of matters to be withheld." Id.
12
Badhwar v. United States Dep't of Air Force, 829 F.2d
182, 186 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
127
Id. (emphasis added).
128
782 F. Supp 628 (D.D.C. 1991).
129
Id. at 632.
14I )

i.

1I1

1&
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tape. 132 After appeals and rehearings, the D.C.

Circuit agreed that the public had a legitimate interest in learning about NASA's conduct, but held
that the tape's release would not further that interest "in any way." 13 3 In so deciding, the court relied on a then recent Supreme Court opinion in
which the Court upheld the FBI's refusal to disclose the "rap sheet" of a private citizen under the
FOIA.'1 4 In United States Department ofJustice v. Re13 5

porters Committee for Freedom of the Press,

the Su-

preme Court applied the following standard in
holding that the public interest was insufficient to
require disclosure:
The basic policy of "full agency disclosure ... focuses
on the citizens' right to be informed about 'what their government is up to." Official information that sheds light on
an agency's performance of its statutory duties falls
squarely within that statutory purpose. That purpose,
however, is not fostered by disclosure of information
about private citizens that is accumulated in various
governmental files but that reveals little or nothing
about an agency's own conduct ....

Indeed, response

to this request would not shed any light on the conduct

of any Government agency or official. 13

The Court went on to reiterate that Congress's
"core purpose" in creating the FOIA was to contribute "significantly to public understanding of
13 7

the operations or activities of the government."
In National Aeronautics and Space Administration,

the plaintiff argued that the "voice inflections and
background noises which are contained only in
the tape would 'contribute significantly' to the
public's understanding of the operations of
NASA." 13s The court found, however, that "any
voice inflections and background noises [on the
tape] ... might reveal something as to whether the

astronauts knew about the disaster and their impending deaths." This would not contribute "anything to the public's knowledge of how NASA operates.' 39 The plaintiff needed to produce more
evidence to make the release of the tape worthwhile under the FOIA standard.
The court did find it significant that NASA had
provided the public with a transcript of the tape.
This transcript reveals to the public every word that was
132
New York Times v. Nat'l Aeronautics and Space Admin., 679 F.Supp 33 (D.D.C. 1987), vacated by 782 F.Supp 628
(D.D.C. 1991).
133 Nat'l Aeronautics and Space Admin., 782 F. Supp at 632.
134 United States Dep't. of Justice v. Reporters Comm.
for the Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 773 (1989).

135

Id.

136

Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Id. at 775 (emphasis in original).
Nat'l Aeronautics and Space Admin., 782 F.Supp. at 633.

137

138

spoken in the cabin. Plaintiff does not dispute its accuracy, but hypothesizes that information can still be
gained from voice inflections and background noises.
The extremely speculative and subjective nature of this
additional information, if available, precludes any finding the information would "significantly contribute" to
the public understanding of the Challenger disaster.14 o

The Court thus found that the public interest in
disclosing the actual recordings was minimal or

nonexistent. 141
Having determined that releasing the CVR tape
would not contribute significantly to the public's
understanding of NASA or the Challenger accident, the court next undertook a balancing test to
determine whether the disclosure of the tape
"would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy."' 1 2 In doing so, the court followed the precedent of O'Connor v. Ortega, which
concluded that a person has "a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office." 143 On one hand,
the National Aeronautics and Space Adminstration
court held that the "'clearly unwarranted' language of the FOIA exemption 6 weights the scales
in favor of disclosure." 144 On the other hand,
however, it determined that "where the privacy interest is substantial, the public interest uncertain,
and where the agency has already released materials responsive to the request, the balance tips towards non-disclosure." 145 The court concluded:
The Challenger families have a substantial privacy interest
in non-disclosure of the tape. Plaintiff has asserted at best a
speculative public interest in disclosure. NASA has
made a written transcript of the tape available to the
public. Thus, the Court determines that the privacy interest in non-disclosure clearly outweighs the public interest.146

Thus, the court held that no one outside the accident investigation scheme-at least no one from
the media-had a legitimate interest in hearing
the astronauts' dying utterances. This holding
thus addresses the piloting community's privacy
objections concerning the release of CVR tapes.
Their other objection involves the problem that
may arise from releasing CVR tapes to the legal
47
establishment. 1
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id.
141
Id.
142
See5 U.S.C. §552(b)(6) (2000).
143
O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 718.
144 Nat'lAeronauticsand Space Admin., 782 F.Supp. at 633.
14"
Id.
146
Id. (emphasis added).
147
See Installation of Cockpit Voice Recorders supra note
15, and accompanyig text.
139

140
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C.

Litigation

Since Congress did not intend "prompt and
complete disclosure" of CVR tapes and unreleased portions of transcripts,

4

how, then, do at-

torneys gain access to materials for litigation purposes? It turns out that the readily available products of both CVRs and FDRs are frequently used
by both sides in litigation-often, with decisive results. Access to actual recordings is simply unnecessary.
In the wake of American Flight 965's crash in
the mountains near Cali, Colombia in 1995 that
killed all but four people aboard, multiple liability
claims arose against American and others. One
case against American, In re Air Crash Near Cali,
Columbia on December 20, 1995, that involved the
pilots' estates and American's parent company,
made effective use of a transcription of the CVR
tape in a successful motion for summary judg1 49

ment.

In Cali, the aircraft approached from the north,
and the pilots wanted to land to the south.'15 In
other words, the pilots wanted to land the plane
straight ahead rather than by having to overfly the
airport and turn back around, which would have
added several minutes to an already delayed
flight.' 5' The clearance for this approach came
late in the arrival process, so the pilots had to expedite their descent.'.5 The CVR transcript shows
that the pilots entered an incorrect navigation fix
into the computer, resulting in the aircraft turning east into mountainous terrain while in de14"

See 49 U.S.C. §1114(c) (2000).

149

151

985 F.Supp. 1106 (1997).
Id. at III.

151

Id.

152

[i. at 1118.
Id. at 1119.

153
154

i. at 1138.

See Honeywell International, Inc.'s Enhanced
Ground Proximity Warning System (EGPWS), at http://
www.egpws.com/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2002). The Web site
provides one manufacttrer's informative descriptions of the
newest technologies available to warn pilots about impending
controlled flight into terrain ("CFIT") and provides an audio
example of the aural warning. GPWS and its younger sibling
EGPWS provide cockpit warnings concerning approaching
terrain. Older systems were triggered by either the aircraft's
height above terrain as measured by a radio altimeter or an
excessive rate of descent. The newest systems generate warnings by comparing present aircraft position to an onboard
database of terrain elevations. Since the EGPWS systems
"look" at the area in front of an aircraft and not just straight
down, they can warn pilots of rising terrain in front of their
aircraft, thereby giving precious additional time to make cor155

scent. 5" The pilots were evidently unaware of
how far off track they were and probably could
see nothing outside the airplane in the dark of
night. 54 The aircraft's Ground Proximity Warn-

ing System ("GPWS") 155 warned them of the approaching terrain too late. 15" The aircraft crashed
57

13 seconds later.
The Cali court relied heavily on the CVR transcript1 58 in entering summary judgment for the
plaintiffs.
[O]ne of [the pilots'] grievous errors-their continued
descent from a position that was radically off course at
night in an environment where the risk from high terrain was palpable and profound-was so plainly reckless, so dangerous, so extreme a violation of the standard of care and so directly responsible for the collision
with the mountain-that even allowing the Defendant
every benefit of the doubt, the law requires that summary judgment be entered for the Plaintiffs on this basis alone. 159

Without the detailed information provided by the
transcripts, a clear understanding of why this airplane crashed likely would never have been
found. Moreover, proving liability would have
been difficult, making summary judgment unlikely.'"" Here, access to the actual tapes was unnecessary because the transcripts were sufficient
to persuade the court to rule in the plaintiffs
favor.
In an intriguing twist, the Cali court had access
to two transcripts and the audio tape. The transcript used by the plaintiffs in their motion was
obtained from the NTSB,1 6 1 and the other was
62
produced by an expert retained by American.
The record does not show how the court came
rections. Id.
156
See Ca/i, 985 F. Supp. at 1122.
157 See i.
158
Id. at 1115. "A great deal of our understanding of
what unfolded during the final minutes of Flight 965 is based
on the cockpit voice recorder ... [transcript]." Id.
159

Id.

n60 Summary judgment is a "procedural device available
for prompt and expeditious disposition of controversy without trial when there is no dispute as to either material fact or
inferences to be drawn from undisputed facts, or if only question of law is involved." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1435
(1990). See also, FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

161 See Cali, 985 F.Supp at 1115. The NTSB does not investigate accidents nor produce CVR transcripts for the purpose of litigation, but the portions that are pertinent to an
accident investigation are made public in accordance with 49
U.S.C. §1114(c), which states "the Board shall make public
any part of a transcript or any written depiction of visual information the Board decides is relevant to the accident or
incident."
162 i.
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into possession of the tape.' 63 Considering that
Colombian authorities, not the NTSB, conducted
this investigation, and that American Airlines
("American") was the owner of the CVR, 16 4 it is
probable that the tape came from one of these
65

two sources. 1

Two issues arise from this twist of circumstance.
First, the audio recording's availability did not alter the case's outcome. In fact, the opinion only
mentions the recording, which was played in
chambers with both counsel present, 166 when it
discusses the differences between the two transcripts. 67 It appears that comparing the two transcripts and the tape merely demonstrated that the
American-produced transcript benefited the airline, while the NTSB's transcript more accurately
reflected the recording. 168 This outcome supports
continued reliance on transcripts produced by
neutral experts and also argues against litigants'
discovery of recordings.
The evidence provided by the CVR transcripts,
however, demonstrated American's liability
clearly enough to support the motion for summary judgment. 16 9 As American and the court
both learned, possession of the actual recording
did not provide any additional evidence, alter the
dramatic story told in the NTSB transcript, or
change the case's outcome.
The second issue that arises in the context of
litigation involves access to the tapes. At the completion of an investigation, the tape is returned to
the aircraft operator.1 7 0 If one side in a case has a
copy of the tape, it would seem only fair that opponents have access as well. In Cali, both sides evidently had access to the CVR tape because it was
"reviewed in chambers and in the presence of
counsel.' 1 7 1 Barring a similar set of circumstances,
where the recording apparently is released by an
entity other than the NTSB, there can be a percep163

See generally, Cali, 985 F. Supp. at 1153-54.
See INVESTIGATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 123, at 3-148.
Cali, 985 F. Supp. at 1115. The court noted in its Order that the differences between the transcripts were "generally of little moment" as determined by the judge after having
164
165

listened to the tape. Id.
166

Id. at 1140 n.21.

167

Id.
Id. at 1134 n.18, 1139 n.21.

168
.19
170
171
172

173

Id. at 1153.
See IN&ESTIGATOR'S

MANUAL,

supra note 123, at 3-148.

Cali, 965 F.Supp at 1139 n.21.

See INVESTIGATOR'S

MANUAL,

supra note 123, at 3-148.

See NTSB Providing Technical Assistance to FBI Investigation, supra note 7.

tion that if the federal government is a litigant, the
government might have an advantage in the case.
The reality, however, is that while the tape is in
the government's possession, it is with the NTSB
for an accident investigation1 72 or the FBI for a
criminal investigation,1 73 but is not available to
other agencies not directly involved in the investi74

gation.1

The conundrum produced by the government's
possession of a tape is addressed tangentially in
the case, McGilvra v. National TransportationSafety
Board, involving the crash of a United Airlines 737
on March 3, 1991 while it was on approach to the
airport in Colorado Springs, Colorado. 1 75 All of

those aboard were killed, including a relative of
Jack McGilvra. 176 McGilvra sought a copy of the
CVR tape through the FOIA. 177 The NTSB re-

fused to release the tape, citing section 1905(c) of
the Independent Safety Board Act.178 On appeal,

the NTSB's Managing Director again denied release of the tape.1 79 This last denial led McGilvra
to file suit in the Federal District Court in the District of Colorado seeking a copy of the tape for
accident reconstruction purposes.' 8 ° McGilvra
submitted three arguments to support his claim:
(1) the statutory prohibition regarding NTSB release found in section 1905 of the ISBA' 81 was not
a FOIA exemption; (2) the tape should be released pursuant to section 1903(d) (3) of the ISBA
because it was necessary for a fair trial; and (3)
that section 1905 of the ISBA was unconstitu182
tional.
The court did not accept any of McGilvra's arguments. 1

3

The court determined that the stat-

ute qualified as a FOIA exemption. 8 4 Therefore,
it did not have the authority to grant discovery
under section 1905(d) (3) of the ISBA.
This court is not oblivious to the seeming unfairness of
the practical impact of the above cited statutes: to allow
See INVESTIGATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 123, at 3-148.
McGilvra v. Nat'l Transportation Safety Bd., 840
F.Supp.100 (Colo. 1993).
176
See id. The published opinion does not describe
plaintiff's relationship to the decedent, Paula McGilvra. Id.
177 McGilvra, 840 F.Supp. at 101.
178
See ISBA Amendments of 1990, supra, note 98.
179
McGilvra, 840 F.Supp. at 101.
180 Id.
181
See ISBA Amendments of 1990, supra, note 98. (Title
49 has been partially revised, placing these restrictions in a
new section. The current citation is 49 U.S.C. §1154 (2000)).
182
McGilvra, 840 F. Supp. at 101.
174

175

183

Id.

184

Id. at 102.
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representatives of defendants in air crash cases access
to CVR tapes in their capacities as parties designated to
participate in the investigation, while denying plaintiffs
and their representatives and expert investigators equal
access to the facts. This argument, however, must be addressed to Congress, not to a court where, as here, the
intent of Congress is clear.' H5

Thus, the court recognized the government's legitimate requirement to withhold a CVR tape
from a plaintiff seeking it for litigation purposes.
Another case is also illustrative. During the
night of September 1, 1983, Soviet fighters shot
down Korean Airlines ("KAL") Flight 007, when it
strayed from its planned route into Soviet airspace
over the Sea of Japan.I1 ' The FDR and CVR were
recovered by Soviet authorities and held for almost a decade. 8 7 Meanwhile, In re Korean Air
Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983, a consolidation
of some 190 cases, a jury returned a verdict that
the 747's loss and the deaths of everyone on
board were proximately caused by the willful misconduct of KAL Flight 007's pilots.' 88 The decision was upheld, but punitive damages were va89
cated pursuant to the Warsaw Convention.
In October 1992, after the Soviet Union's collapse, and more than nine years after KAL Flight
007 was shot down, the Russian Federation released documentation surrounding the incident. 9 This was followed by the release of the
CVR and FDR from KAL 007, along with recordings and transcripts of the conversations of the Soviet fighter pilots responsible for shooting down
the airliner.' 9 1 In June of 1993, based on this
newly acquired information, ICAO issued a report
that shed some light on the events of September
1, 1983.192 Armed with this report, KAL filed a
motion to vacate and set aside the earlier judgment."g-zl The motion was denied under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(2)194 because the
recorders and their information were considered
Id. at 102 (emphasis added).
186 See In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1,
1983, 932 F.2d 1475, 1478 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
187 See In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1,
1983, 156 F.R.D. 18, 20 (1994).
188 Korean, 932 F.2d at 1477.
189 Korean, 156 F.R.D. at 14.
190 1d. at 20.
191 Id.
192 Id.
193
Id.
194 Id.
195 Id. at 22.
196 iJ
197 Id. at 25.
185
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"newly discovered evidence" which was not sub95
mitted within the Rule's one-year time limit.
The court also held that the ICAO report and the
information on the recorders supported the jury's
guilty verdict, 196 and accordingly, it denied KAL's
97
motion for equitable relief'1
While KAL could not avail itself of the information available from the recorders, others could.
Eric Forman, the husband of a passenger killed
on KAL Flight 007, made use of the data from the
CVR and FDR.' 981 In Forman v. Korean Air Lines,
Forman was awarded damages for his wife's predeath pain and suffering.199 The court reversed
other jury awards. 110 Both KAL and Forman appealedY.1 The D.C. Circuit upheld the award for
the wife's pre-death pain and suffering. 20 2 This
decision was based largely on the information
from the recorders,20 3 but no one had to hear the
actual recordings to make the award determina2 4
tion.
The issue of passenger pre-death pain and suffering turned on a determination of whether or
not those aboard the doomed airplane could have
survived the initial explosion caused by the missile.2115 Each side produced expert witnesses testifying to support, their contentions that the occupants of the airplane did or did not survive the
initial explosion and loss of pressurization long
enough to have experienced any physical pain
and suffering.2 06 While earlier cases were forced
to rely on expert speculation, the Forman court
had the benefit of the information from the recorders.
The ICAO report showed that the FDR continued to run for at least 104 seconds after the missile's impact.2 0 7 No mention is made as to
whether the recorders stopped because the FDR
lost power or because the aircraft broke apart.
KAL argued that the missile must have blown a
198

See generally Forman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 84 F.3d

446 (D.C.Cir. 1996).
199 Id. at 448.
2010
2011
202

2(13

Id.
Id. at 447.
Id.
Id. at 449.

204 Id. (explaining that expert testimony provided the
requisite evidence for the court to make its determination.
No mention is made of publicly playing the CVR audio
tapes.).
Id. at 448.
205
206
207

Id.
Id. at 449.
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large hole in the fuselage, 20 8 thus equalizing the

pressure inside the cabin with the pressure
outside at 35,000 feet, rendering the passengers
20
unconscious and "thus anesthetized to pain."

9

The CVR, however, "captured the flight crew's
post impact actions and utterances."' 21 0 Based on

this information, Forman's experts testified that
the passengers had enough time to put their oxygen masks on and remain conscious for the 9 to
12 minute descent to the ocean.2 1 I This was ample time for the passengers to suffer anguish from
the specter of the, impending crash and physical
pain from rapid decompression. 2 12 Thus, this crucial sliver of evidence from the CVR that was delivered by the ICAO's written report was the
lynchpin in this successful pursuit of damages for
pain and suffering. Access to the CVR tape itself
was unnecessary.
Attorneys who seek access to actual CVR recordings often argue that because the NTSB's initial
findings are not admissible in court, 2 13 the attorneys must assemble their own team of experts, including CVR speech pathologists, to supplement
the small amount of available information. 21 4 A
recent example, however, serves to demonstrate
that even the written words of a CVR transcript
can produce rich evidentiary material.
On December 15, 1993, a Westwind business jet
crashed while on approach to John Wayne Airport
in Santa Ana, California.2" 5 The small airplane encountered violent wake turbulence and became
208

Id.

209
210

/d.
Id.

211

Id.

212

Id.

213

See, 49 U.S.C. §1154(b) (1994) (stating that "[n]o

uncontrollable when it followed too closely to a
Boeing 757.216 The results of the crash became
the subject of Management Activities, Inc. v. United
States.2" I The Westwind CVR transcript, used in a
cross-claim action against the government alleging negligence by the FAA, indicated pilot error.218 The opinion points out that "[a] reasonable Westwind pilot .. . [in these circumstances]

would be very concerned about potential wake turbulence affecting much smaller aircraft." ' 21

9

The

CVR transcript contained several statements by
the pilots indicating that they were aware of their
aircraft's proximity to the 757 and that they "realize [d] they were flying into danger." 22 0 The transcript indicated that at least one pilot was "concerned."2'2 Unfortunately, this pilot's concern did
not translate into a response necessary to avert
the crash. 22 2 Nonetheless, the CVR transcript provided sufficient information to show that the pilots were concerned by circumstances they had
gotten themselves into.
D.

Criminal Investigations and Prosecutions:
The Current Battleground

Congress amended the CVR statute again in
The amendment extended the restrictions on public disclosure to "voice and video recorder information for all modes of transportation comparable to the protections already statu2000.228

' 224
torily provided for cockpit voice recorders."

part of a report of the Board, related to an accident or an

1903(c) at §1154(b), Congress used the identical language of
the previous statutes presumably knowing that that language
had been long construed to permit the admissibility of the
factual portions of Group Chairmen's Factual Reports.").
214
See Thomas A. Demetria & Michael K. Demetrio,
Fightingthe Elements, Beyond the Thunder, DealingEffectively with
Adverse Weather and Its Contribution to Air Disaster, 34 AuG

investigation of an accident, may be admitted into evidence

TRIAL 52, 54 (1998).

or used in a civil action for damages resulting from a matter

215
Management Activities, Inc. v. United States, 21 F
.Supp. 2d 1157, 1160 (C.D.Cal. 1998).

mentioned in the report"). See also, e.g. Curry v. Chevron, 779
F.2d 272, 274 (5th. Cir. 1985); Chiron v. NTSB, 198 F.3d 935,
936 (D.D.C. 1999). Notwithstanding the statute's prohibition
of admission of any part of a report of the Board, courts have
generally concluded, and Congress has not corrected the no-

tion, that it is the Board's opinions and conclusions that are
inadmissible, not factual parts of reports. See, e.g., Mullan v.
Quickie Aircraft Corp., 797 F.2d 845, 848 (10th Cir. 1986)
(stating that an "expert witness properly relied on the factual
portions of the NTSB report"); Texasgulf, Inc. v. Colt Electronics Co., Inc., 615 F.Supp. 648, 651 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(explaining that the "NTSB factual findings are admissible in
evidence, but its conclusions, and findings indicating its conclusions, are not"); and In re Air Crash at Charlotte, N.C. on
July 2, 1994, 982 F.Supp. 1071, 1077 (D.S.C. 1996) (explaining that "[s]ignificantly, in recodifying §§1441(e) and

216

Id. at 1161.

See generally id.
Id. at 1171.
219
Id. at 1170 (emphasis added).
220
Id. at 1171.
221
Id. at 1172 (quoting from the CVR transcript, with
nuance interpreted by the team of NTSB experts who produced it) (emphasis added).
222
Id. at 1171-72.
223
National Transportation Safety Board Amendments
Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-424, 114 Stat. 1883 (2000) (hereinafter NTSB Amendment Act of 2000].
224 Id. at 3 (emphasis added). See also Press Release, SenatorJohn McCain, Senate Approves NTSB Amendments Act
217

218

of 2000 (Oct. 3, 2000).
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The amendment also reiterated the confidentiality of recordings, created procedures for the
NTSB to turn over its investigation to the FBI in
the event of an intentional criminal act, and it directed the NTSB and FBI to revise their existing
agreement accordingly.2 25 The amendment is silent on confidentiality of CVR tapes in the context of an FBI criminal investigation. However,
the underlying original intent that recorders and
their products will be used solely for investigative
purposes remains, and no government agency
should be permitted to release more than the
NTSB is permitted to release.
Confidentiality of CVR tapes is coming into play
in the government's case against suspected terrorist Zacarias Moussaoui.2 26 Moussaoui was indicted
on December 11, 2001 on six counts of conspiracy
for alleged acts tied to the events of September
11, 2001.227 In preparation for its plans to play the

CVR tapes during the trial, the Government
moved for a protective order pursuant to the sec8 This
tion 1154 of the NTSB's enabling statute.2 21
section provides:
(4) (A) When a court allows discovery in a judicial proceeding of a part of a cockpit or surface vehicle recorder transcript not made available to the public
under section 1114(c) or 1114(d) of this title ora cockpit or surface vehicle recorder recording, the court
shall issue a protective order(i) to limit the use of the part of the transcript or the
recording to the judicial proceeding; and
(ii) to prohibit dissemination of the part of the transcript or the recording to any person that does not

225

See NTSB Amendment Act of 2000, supra note 223 at

§6.
226 Indictment, United States v. Zacarias Moussaoui,
Criminal No. 01-455-A (E.D. Va. filed Dec. 11, 2001), available at http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/1:01-cr-00455/
docs/64329/0.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2002).
227 Id.
228
Government's Motion for Protective Order Regarding Cockpit Voice Recorders Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. §1154 ,
United States v. Zacarias Moussaoui, Criminal No. 01455-A
(E.D. Va. 2001), available at http://notablecases.vaed.us
courts.gov/1:01-cr-00455/docs/67044/0.pdf (last visited
Nov. 7, 2002) [hereinafter Government's Motion].
229 49 U.S.C. §1154 (1994).
230
Brief of Gannett Satellite Information Network, Inc.
Opposing the Government's Motion for Protective Order Regarding Cockpit Voice Recorders, United States v. Zacarias
Moussaoui, Criminal No. 01455-A (E.D. Va. 2001), available
at http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/1:01-cr-00455/
docs/67147/0.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2002).
231

Id.

Brief of Intervenor Air Line Pilots Association, International in Opposition to Gannett Satellite Information Network, Inc.'s Request for Access to Cockpit Voice Recorder
232
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need access to the part of the transcript or the recording for the proceeding.
(B) A court may allow a part of a cockpit or surface
vehicle recorder transcript not made available to the
public under section 1114(c) or 1114(d) of this title or
a cockpit or surface vehicle recorder recording to be
admitted into evidence in ajudicial proceeding, only if
the court places the part of the transcript or the recording under seal to prevent the use of the part of the transcript or the 2recording
for purposes other than for the
9
proceeding.

Gannett Satellite Information Network, Inc.
("Gannett"), publisher of USA Today, opposed the
government's motion. 23 1 1Gannett argued that the
public has a First Amendment right of public access to the trial and that this right includes access
to all documents that are submitted during the
23
course of the trial. 1
In its reply brief, the ALPA argued that the CVR
23 2
statute specifically prohibits releasing the tapes.
ALPA also asserted that both the Supreme Court
and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit have upheld withholding sensitive
evidence from the public in the past, including
audio tapes from the media. 233- ALPA argued that
in order to maintain confidentiality, access to the
tapes and transcripts presented during the hearing should be restricted.2 3, 4 ALPA cited decisions
upholding the exclusion of press and public from
a criminal trial 235 in order to demonstrate the

lack of a constitutional or common law right of
access to CVR tapes,2 3 6 and to demonstrate the restrictions in place to limit the media from gaining
237
access to CVR audio tapes played in court.
Tapes, United States v. Zacarias Moussaoui, Criminal No. 01455-A, available at http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/
1:01-cr-00455/docs/67744/0.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2002).
233
See id. (citing Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc.,
435 U.S. 589, 608-10 (1978) and In re Washington Post Co.,
807 F.2d 383, 390 (4th Cir. 1986)).
234
Id. at 14.
235
Id. (citing Bell v.Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 166-68 (4th Cir.
2000) (explaining that the "right of press and public to attend a criminal trial is a qualified right; there, the interest in
safeguarding physical and psychological well-being of minors
prevailed and the public and press were properly excluded")).
2_35
Id. at 17 (citing United States v. Calloway, No. 9420112 (W.D. Tenn., Aug. 31, 1995) (stating that the "court
need not decide [the statutory] issue, however, because even
assuming that [section] 1154 does not prevent release of the
tape, the court finds the media do not have a constitutional or
common law right of access to the tape") (emphasis added).
2317
Id. at 16-17 (citing US Airways, Inc. v. Parker-Hannifin Corp., C.A. No. 99-CV-917 (W.D. Pa., June 19, 2002)).
See also Government's Motion, supra note 228, at 2 (explaining that "[d]uring the US Airways litigation, the CVR recording was played in open court as part of an aircraft animation,
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IV.

FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

In the wake of the events of September 11, the
FAA has proposed that video cameras be installed
in airplane cabins. 238 By looking at the feeds produced by the cameras, pilots then could monitor
what is happening from behind their barricaded
cockpit door. 239 This proposal is only one part of
the FAA's new Enhanced Airplane Security Program. 240 Long before September 11, however,
the NTSB recommended that cockpit video recorders be used to supplement CVRs.24 1 For example, in April 2000, the NTSB recommended installing cockpit video recorders2 4 2 in planes,
largely in response to the crash of an Egypt Air
Boeing 767 into the Atlantic Ocean near Nantucket, Massachusetts on October 23, 1999.243 Although there is no conclusive evidence available
concerning the Egypt Air crash, the CVR recording has led some to believe that the co-pilot may
have crashed the plane deliberately. 24 4 First, investigators concluded that there were no mechanical
245
problems with the airplane when it crashed.
Second, CVR information indicated that the copilot was alone in the cockpit and uttered what
may have been a prayer 24 6 before the autopilot
was disengaged, and the aircraft plummeted into
the ocean. 247 During the high speed descent anand the Court, consistent with [section] 1154(a) (4) (B),
placed the CVR audio under seal. The Court granted WTAETV access to a videotape of the animation with the CVR redacted.").
238

FAA, FAA ENHANCED AIRPLANE SECURITY PROGRAM, at

http://www.airweb.faa.gov/airplanesecurity/announce.htm
(last visited Oct. 30, 2002).
239 Id.
240 Id. There are current initiatives by airlines and others
to install video surveillance cameras in aircraft cabins and
outside the aircraft to enable pilots to observe potentially
threatening activity in the cabin and on the ground. In fact, a
panel organized by the ICAO made such recommendations a
year before the terrorist attacks of September, 2001. See Chris
Woodyard, Panel Wants Cameras in Plane Cabins, USA TODAY,
Sept. 28, 2000, at lB. In the aftermath of the September,
2001 attacks, some airlines have already begun to install these
cameras. See Dennis Blank, Surveillance Cameras Set to Keep
Watch in Airliners, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2002, at C1.
241 See Acting NTSB Chairman Jim Hall, Address at the
Global Airline Industry Program, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, at http://www.ntsb.gov/speeches/former/hall/

jhc001129.htm (Nov. 29, 2000).
242 Safety Recommendation Letter from Jim Hall, Chairman, NTSB to Jane Garvey, Administrator of the FAA (Apr.
11, 2000), at http://www.ntsb.gov/recs/letters/2000/
A0030_31.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2002) (detailing NTSB
safety recommendations A-00-30 and A-00-31) [hereinafter
Safety Recommendations A-00-30 and A-00-31).
243 See Investigators: All Signs Indicate Egypt Air Crash Was

other voice, presumably belonging to the captain
who had then returned from the lavatory, asked
" [W] hat's happening, Gamil? 248 . . . "What is this?
What is this? Did you shut the engine(s)?" 2 49 The

Egyptian Government has rejected the intentional
crash

' 2 511
theory as "unacceptable speculation."

The NTSB concluded that the probable cause of
the accident was "the airplane's departure from
normal cruise flight, and subsequent impact with
the Atlantic Ocean as a result of the relief first officer's flight control inputs. The reason for the re25
lief first officer's actions was not determined."
Regardless of the crash's real cause, if a video
recorder had been present in the cockpit, the investigators may have enjoyed an easier investigation process that yielded results having a higher
degree of certainty. Accordingly, the NTSB recommended installing video recorders in cockpits. 25 2 This proposal is still being reviewed, and it

is likely to gain more attention in the post-September 11th world. If done properly, installation
of cockpit video recorders could provide a useful
tool for accident investigators. If not done properly, cockpit video recorders could provide an irresistible target for the media and for litigators
who may be unable to resist exploiting these powerful and tragic images.
Deliberate, PEOPLE'S DAILY ONLINE, at http://english.people
daily.com.cn/200001/21/eng20000l2lWl25.html (Jan. 21,
2000) [hereinafter Investigators].
244
See id.
245
See id.
246 See NTSB, VEHICLE RECORDERS DIVISION, SPECIALIST'S
FACTUAL REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

DCAOOMA006 (authored

by Albert G. Reitan) at 37, at http://www.ntsb.gov/events/
EA990/docket/Ex_12A.pdf (Feb. 10, 2000) (last visited Oct.
30, 2002) [hereinafter NTSB SPECIALIST's FACrUAL REPORT OF
INVESTIGATION, CVR TRANSCRIPT] (citing to a translated CVR
transcript, which states that the co-pilot of the Egypt Air
flight uttered, "I rely on God.").
247 See NTSB, AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT BRIEF: EGYPTAIR FLIGHT
990, BOEING 7670366ER, SU-GAP, 60 Miles South of Nan-

tucket, Massachusetts, October 31, 1999, at 4, available at

http://www.ntsb.gov/Publictn/2002/aab0201.htm
March 13, 2002) [herinafter NTSB, AIRCRAFT

(released
ACCIDENT

BRIEF: EGYPTAIR FLIGHT 990].
248

See NTSB

SPECIALIST'S FACTYUAL REPORT OF INVESTIGA-

CVR TRANSCRIPT, suprfa note 246, at 37.
249
Id. at 38.
250
See BBC NEWS, Egypt Rejects Air Crash Report, at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/middle east/newsid_1287000/1287296.stm (Apr. 20, 2001) (last visited Oct.
30, 2002).
251
See NTSB, AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT BRIEF: EGYPTAIR FLIGHT
990, supra note 247.
252
Safety Recommendations A-00-30 and A-00-31, supra
note 242.
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V.

CONCLUSION

The original intent of placing CVRs aboard
commercial airplanes is clear. They are to be used
strictly for accident investigations. It is well-documented that CVRs have served the purpose of
helping to find the cause of aircraft accidents and,
thereby, helping to prevent reoccurrences. In addition, it has been well-documented that CVR
tapes have been misused on occasion. These
abuses have brought inexcusable grief to victims
and their families. It also has forced Congress to
further restrict access to tapes by invoking a
bright line rule of acceptable usage.
The content of the cockpit conversations is not
"privileged" from communication outside government accident investigations, but the playing of
actual CVR tapes is, and must remain so. What
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was said, and what happened are readily ascertainable from transcripts and other publicly available
data. It is not clear, then, that the narrow window
currently available for discovery of CVR audio is
of any justifiable use. As the Cali accident demonstrated, content of CVR tapes still make their way
to the public, and the situation will likely worsen
if cockpit videotapes become the norm. Without
stringent restrictions, the public inevitably will
see, as well as hear pilots' dying moments-to the
glee of some, and the horror of others, including
the families of the pilots left behind. To prevent
what is otherwise inevitable, Congress and the
courts must continue to guard pilots' rights to privacy and their privileged communications in their
offices, the cockpits of the aircraft they fly.

